

#### Stochastic Programming: Basic Theory

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#### Goals

- Provide background on the basics of stochastic programming theory
- Answer the following questions:
  - When is a stochastic programming model consistent?
  - When is a stochastic program solvable?
  - What should be true about an SP solution?
  - What can be inferred from solving one problem to another (sensitivity)?



#### General Model

• Choose  $x \in X$  to:

minimize  $E_w[f(x,w)]$ 

- where:
- *X* can be a general space (and might include dynamics probabilistic constraints)
- *f* can include some form of risk measure
   Categories: Two or multi-stage, recourse (or not), probabilistic constrained, robust..



#### Two-Stage Stochastic Linear Program with (Fixed) Recourse

- Key: Decisions now (x), observe an uncertain outcome (ξ(ω)), take a recourse action y(ω)
- Formulation:

 $\min c^T x + E_{\xi} [ Q(x,\xi) ]$ 

s.t.  $Ax=b, x \ge 0$ 

where  $Q(x, \xi) = min\{ q^T y | Wy = h - Tx, y \ge 0 \}$ 

 $\mathcal{A}(x) = E_{\xi} [Q(x,\xi)]$  is the recourse function and  $\xi$  consists of random components of q, (W), h, T

For the farmer in BL book, randomness is in T (yield).



#### Multi-Stage and Nonlinear Models

• Find  $x_1, \ldots, x_t, \ldots \in X$ 

to minimize

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} E[f_t(x_t, x_{t+1})]$$

• DP/Bellman form:

 $\Psi_{t}(x,w_{t}) = min_{u}f_{t+1}(x,u) + E[\Psi_{t}((x,u),w_{t+1})]$ 

*X*, *f* include constraints and any restrictions (Note: could also have continuous time.)



#### Relationships

- Statistical decision theory:
  - Usually emphasizes information discovery and low dimensions
- Decision analysis
  - Usually few alternatives
- Dynamic programming/Markov decision processes
  - Usually low dimension (often finite state/action)



#### More Relationships

- Stochastic control
  - Usually continuous time and very low dimension
- Machine learning
  - Usually no distributions (online) and focus on regret (relative to best possible)
- Robust optimization
  - No distribution (but an uncertainty set) and measured by the worst possible outcome



#### **Basic Modeling Questions**

- What makes a model consistent?
- What form should objective take?
- What form should the constraints take?
- What can be assumed about the distributions?

(Note: criticism of SP: not knowing distributions?)



#### Model Consistency

- The model should not allow for solutions that cannot be implemented in reality
  - Example: A financial model should not allow arbitrage, i.e., ability to buy and sell and make an infinite profit Conditions:
- Share price=\$1
- Risk-free rate=10%
- Share can go to 0.5 or 2 with equal probability
- Call option with \$1.50 exercise price available for \$0.20
- Problem: Maximize value of portfolio at time 1
  - subject to limited downside risk



#### **Consistency Example**

- Solve with upper bounds of 1 on each asset
- Limit downside risk:

 $(E((Bond - W(1))^+) \le 0.10)$ 

Problems?

Caution: "hidden arbitrage" may lead to quite different solutions from what was intended.



#### **Discovering Arbitrage**

- Example with 2 branches
- Start at S
- Equally likely to uS or dS
- Exercise K: dS<K<uS
- Arbitrage free if  $\nexists x_1, x_2, x_3$  s. t.

 $\begin{array}{l} x_1(uS) + x_2(1+r) + x_3(uS-K) \geq 0 \\ x_1(dS) + x_2(1+r) \geq 0 \end{array}$ 

 $Sx_1+x_2+Cx_3=0$  $x_1(p u + (1-p)d)S + x_2(1+r)+x_3(p(uS-K))>0$  for any 0



Using Theorem of Alternative (ToA:  $\exists Ax > 0, b^T x > 0 \Leftrightarrow \exists \pi > 0, s.t. -\pi^T A = b^T$  (=> C must make A lower rank)) or  $\exists \pi_1 \ge 0, \pi_2 \ge 0, \pi_3$  s.t.  $(p+\pi_1)u+(1-p+\pi_2)d=\pi_3, (p+\pi_1+(1-p)+\pi_2)(1+r)=\pi_3,$  $(\pi_1+p)((uS-K)/C)=\pi_3$ or for  $q=(p+\pi_1)(1+r)/\pi_3$ ,  $1-q=(1-p+\pi_2)(1+r)/\pi_3$ ;  $R_i(s)$ =Value in state s/Value at 0= $S_1(i)/S_0(i)$  $q R_i(High) + (1-q) R_i(Lo) = (1+r)$  for any asset i **General:**  $\exists$  **Q** (risk-neutral or equivalent martingale measure) s.t.  $E_0[S_t(i)/S_{t-1}(i)] = (1+r_t)$ , for all i



#### Check Example

If C=0.2, what happens? Try solving for q? Finding consistent value:  $x_3 = x_2(1+r)(u-d)/(d(uS-K)), x_1 = -(1+r)x_2/dS,$ => C = ((1+r)-dS)(uS-K))/((u-d)(1+r))Here, u=2,d=0.5, S=1, K=1.5  $x_1 = 2.2x_2, x_3 = 6.6x_2, C = 2/11 = 0.181818...$ q=0.4, 1-q=0.6



#### **General Results**

• For each set of branches,

The no-arbitrage condition must hold; so,

- $\exists$  consistent Q
- If not, need to modify prices on each branch.
- Otherwise, results may have a bias that is hard to detect (arbitrage will over-whelm any other part of solution).
- Practical approach: relax constraints and check for unbounded and non-intuitive results
- Klaassen (1998) also shows how to collapse branches together (aggregation) and maintain consistency.



#### Other Forms of Consistency

- When are models consistent with rational preferences?
  - Axioms (e.g., von Neumann-Morganstern)
  - $\Rightarrow$ Expected utility
  - More information is better
- When are models consistent other forms of behavioral choice?
- Can we learn about the model's form from choices?
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 $\begin{array}{l} \begin{array}{l} \textbf{Paradoxes and Pitfalls} \\ \textbf{Assumption: More information improves decision making or} \\ \textbf{EVPI} \geq 0 \end{array}$ 

Information Consistency:

Value of Information: "Blau's dilemma" Suppose demand=b=0 w.p. 0.9 and 1 w.p. 0.1 Problem:

> $min \ x \ s.t. \ P[x \ge b] \ge 0.9$ Solution:  $x^*=0$

With perfect information:  $x^P = 0$  w.p. 0.9 and 1 w.p. 0.1

EVPI = Exp. Value without Perfect Information – Exp. Value with Perfect Information

= 0 - 0.1 = -0.1 < 0

(Same may be true with EVSampleInformation)

For RO, let  $\Xi = \{b | P[b] \ge 0.9\} = \{0\}$ 

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#### Problems with "Paradox"

- Utility may depend on information level
  - With no information, 0.9 may be acceptable but is not the same with more information
  - Cannot make direct comparisons in information value
- Not including role of competitor (something not in model but in consideration)
  - Competitor may gain information as well
  - In this case, more information may not always be beneficial



# What is Missing with Probabilistic Constraint?

- May not correspond to "axioms of choice" or other properties
- Example: Value-at-Risk:

 $VaR_{1-\alpha}(\mathbf{x}(\xi)) = -\inf\{t | P(\mathbf{x}(\xi) \le t) \ge \alpha\}$ Non-convexity  $\mathbf{x}_1 = \{-1 \text{ w.p. } 0.005, 0 \text{ w.p. } 0.995\}$  $\mathbf{x}_2 = \{-1 \text{ w.p. } 0.005, 0 \text{ w.p. } 0.995\}$  $VaR_{.99}(\mathbf{X}_1) = 0, VaR_{.99}(\mathbf{X}_2) = 0$ Possible:  $VaR_{.99}((\mathbf{X}_1 + \mathbf{X}_2)) = 1$  (with correlation) Alternatives? Coherent risk measures (but are they consistent with actual choice?)



#### Axioms and Coherent Risk Measures

- Von Neumann-Morgenstern (rational) utility (negative risk): Complete, Transitive, Continuous, Monotonic, Substitutable (Independent) Implies convexity (concavity) of preferences Independence is like the additive term for coherent risk Both are unclear in practice.
- *R* is a *coherent risk measure* if
  - R is convex and decreasing
  - $R(x(\xi)+a)=R(x(\xi)) a, a \in \mathcal{R}$
  - $R(\lambda x(\xi)) = \lambda R(x(\xi))$

*Note: this is risk for positive outcomes (gains); if*  $\xi$  *is a random loss, use*  $x(\xi)+a=-\xi-a$ .



#### Issues with Axioms

- They may not represent actual choices
   Prospect theory
- They may be require information (to distinguish among choices) than what we can measure
  - Heyde and Kou (2004) show that distinguishing exponential from power tails may require an excessive number of observations

# CHICAGO BOOTH Do Axioms Capture Real Choices?

- What is observed? (Kahnemann-Tversky prospect theory)
  - Targets define utility
  - Preference depends on closeness to targets





#### **Consistent Model: Formulation**

• Two-stage stochastic linear program:  $\min z = c^T x + E_{\xi} [\min q(\omega)^T y(\omega)]$ 

s.t. 
$$A x = b$$

$$T(\omega) x + W y (\omega) = h (\omega) (a.s.)$$

$$x\geq 0, \ y(\omega)\geq 0$$

#### Example: News vendor



#### News Vendor Formulation

- x = number of papers to buy
- c = cost of the papers minus price (-price+cost)
- Ax =b (maybe limit on how many to buy)
- Tx + Wy = h, x + y1 y2 = h (demand)
- y1 = unmet demand (no revenue)
- y2 = papers not sold
- q = (0, price-salvage) for y1 and y2



#### **Recourse Function**

• Deterministic Equivalent Program  $\min z = c^{T} x + Q(x)$ s.t. Ax = b, x > 0where  $Q(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{E}_{\xi} \mathbf{Q}(\mathbf{x}, \xi(\omega))$  and  $Q(x, \xi(\omega))$  $= \min_{v} \{ q(\omega)^{T} y | W y = h(\omega) - T(\omega) x, y \ge 0 \}$ 

#### CHICAGO BOOTH W When Does a Solution Exist? (Feasibility)

• Definitions

$$\begin{split} &K_1 = \; \{ \; x \mid Ax = b, \, x \geq 0 \; \} \\ &K_2 = \; \{ \; x \mid \mathcal{Q}(x) < \infty \; \}, \, K_2^{\; P} = \cap_{\xi \in \; \Xi} \{ x \mid Q(x,\xi) < \infty \} \\ &x \in K_1 \cap K_2 \end{split}$$

• Results:

 $K_2^P = K_2$  if  $\Xi$  finite or W is fixed and  $\xi$  has finite second moments, which also means:

K<sub>2</sub> is closed and convex.

If T is fixed, K<sub>2</sub> is polyhedral.

Let  $\Xi_T$  be the support of the distribution of **T**. If h( $\xi$ ) and T( $\xi$ ) are independent and  $\Xi_T$  is polyhedral, then K<sub>2</sub> is polyhedral.

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• For a stochastic program with fixed recourse,  $Q(x,\xi)$  is

a piecewise linear convex function in (h,T);

a piecewise linear concave function in q;

- a piecewise linear convex function in x for all x in K =  $K_1 \cap K_2$ .
- Proof: Linear supports use duality.
- With finite second moments, Q(x) is:
   Lipschitzian, convex, finite on K<sub>2</sub>, p.l. if Ξ finite, differentiable on K<sub>2</sub> if F(ξ) abs. continuous



#### **Basic Properties**



#### **Special Cases**

- Complete recourse  $K_2 = \Re^{n1}$
- Relatively complete recourse  $K_2 \supset K_1$
- Simple recourse

W=[ I, -I],  $q = (q^+, q^-)$ 

Holds for the news vendor problem



#### **Optimality Conditions**

- Existence: suppose  $\xi$  has finite second moments and either K is bounded or Q becomes linear eventually, then optimum attained if it exists.
- Conditions:

Suppose a finite optimal value. A solution  $x^* \in K_1$ , is optimal in DEP if and only if there exists some  $\lambda^* \in \Re^{m1}$ ,  $\mu^* \in \Re^{n1}_+$ ,  $\mu^{*T}x^*=0$ , such that,

 $\begin{aligned} -c + A^{T}\lambda^{*} + \mu^{*} &\in \partial \mathcal{Q}(x^{*}).\\ \partial \mathcal{Q}(x^{*}) &= E[\partial Q(x^{*},\xi)] + N(K_{2},x^{*}) \end{aligned}$ 



#### Duality

Assume  $X = \mathcal{L}_{\infty}(\Omega, \mathcal{B}, \mu; \Re^{n1+n2})$ , the SP is feasible, has a bounded optimal value, and satisfies relatively complete recourse, a solution  $(x^{*}(\omega),y^{*}(\omega))$  is optimal if and only if there exist integrable functions on  $\Omega$ ,  $(\lambda^*(\omega), \rho^*(\omega), \pi^*(\omega))$ , such that  $c_i - \lambda^*(\omega) A_{i} - \rho^*(\omega) - \pi^{*T}(\omega)T_{i}(\omega) \ge 0$ , a.s.,  $j=1,...,n_1$  $(c_j - \lambda^*(\omega) A_{j} - \rho^*(\omega) - \pi^{*T}(\omega)T_{j}(\omega))x_j^*(\omega) = 0, a.s.,$  $j=1,...,n_1,$  $q_i(\omega) - \pi^{*T}(\omega)W_{i} \ge 0, a.s., j=1,...,n_2$  $(q_{i}(\omega) - \pi^{*T}(\omega)W_{i})y_{i}^{*}(\omega) = 0, a.s., j=1,...,n_{2},$ and  $E_{\omega}[\rho^*(\omega)] = 0.$ 

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#### More Duality

General duals

z\*=sup <c,x> s.t. x∈ (N + b)∩(C+d)
where N is a subspace, C is a cone
w\*= inf <b,π>+ <d,ρ> s.t. c=π + ρ, π ⊥ N,ρ ∈ C\*
where C\* is the polar cone to C, i.e., C\*={y / y<sup>T</sup> x≤0 ∀x∈C}
Why z\*≤ w\*?

z\*=<c,x\*> = <π\*+p\*,x\*>

 $\begin{array}{l} = <\pi^*, x^* > + <\rho^*, x^* > \\ = <\pi^*, n^* + b > + <\rho^*, v^* + d > (n^* \in N, v^* \in C) \\ \leq <\pi^*, b > + <\rho^*, d > = w^* \end{array}$ 

• Why z\*=w\*? (If not, some form of separation for linear problems but may have issues for general nonlinear problems.)

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x\*⁄



#### Dual SLP

- Find  $(\lambda(\omega), \rho(\omega), \pi(\omega))$  to max  $E[\lambda(\omega)^T b + \pi(\omega)^T h(\omega)]$ s.t.  $\lambda(\omega)^T A + \pi(\omega)^T T(\omega) + \rho(\omega)^T \leq c^T$ , a.s.  $\pi(\omega)^T W \leq q(\omega)^T$ , a.s.  $E(\rho(\omega))=0$
- Note: possibly multiple rho values but all only differ in the constant.



#### Problems with No Complete Recourse

• min x s.t. x > 0 + Q(x) $Q(\mathbf{x}) = 0$  if  $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{x} - \xi(\omega) > 0$  $\infty$  O.W.  $\xi \sim U(k/K), k=0,...,K-1$ Multipliers:  $\rho^{k}=1, \pi^{k}=0, k=0,...,K-2$  $\rho^{K-1} = 1 - K, \pi^{K-1} = K$ As  $K \to \infty$ ,  $\sup(|\rho|) \to \infty$ 

#### CHICAGO BOOTH Multistage Formulation (Linear Problems Linear Program:

$$\begin{split} \min z &= c^{1} x^{1} + \mathrm{E}_{\xi^{2}}[\min c^{2}(\omega) x^{2}(\omega^{2}) \\ &+ \ldots + \mathrm{E}_{\xi^{H}}[\min c^{H}(\omega) x^{H}(\omega^{H})]] \\ \mathrm{s.t.} \quad W^{1} x^{1} &= h^{1}, \\ T^{1}(\omega) x^{1} + W^{2} x^{2}(\omega^{2}) &= h^{2}(\omega), \end{split}$$

 $T^{H-1}(\omega) x^{H-1}(\omega^{H-1}) + W^H x^H(\omega^H) = h^H(\omega),$  $x^1 \ge 0; x^t(\omega^t) \ge 0, t=2,...,H$ 

. . . . .



#### **General Optimality Conditions**

General Form:

min  $z = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} f_t(x_t, x_{t+1})$ s.t  $x_t - E[x_t / \Sigma_t] = 0$ , a.s.,  $\forall t \ge 0$ Need:

## nonanticipative feasibility, strict feasibility, finite horizon continuation

Then  $x^*$  is optimal with given initial conditions  $x^0$  iff there exist  $\pi^t \in L^n_{-1}(\Sigma)$ , t=0,... such that  $\pi^t$  is nonanticipative  $E^0(f^0(x^0,x^1) - \pi^0 x^0 + \pi^1 x^1)$  is a.s. minimized by  $x^{*1}$  over  $x^1 = E[x^1/\Sigma^1]$ , and, for t > 0 $E[f^t(x^t, x^{t+1}) - \pi^t x^t + \pi^{t+1} x^{t+1}]$  is a.s. minimized by  $(x^{*t}, x^{*t+1})$  over  $x^t = E[x^t/\Sigma^t]$ 

 $\Sigma^{t}$  and  $x^{t+1} = E[x^{t+1}/\Sigma^{t+1}]$ 

and  $E\pi^{t_k}(x^{t_k} - x^{*t_k}) \to 0$  as  $t_k \to \infty$ , for all  $x \in dom z$ . © JRBirge ICSP, Bergamo, July 2013



#### **DP** Version

• Bellman Equation

 $V_{t}(x_{t}) = \min f_{t}(x_{t}, u_{t}) + E[V_{t+\delta}(x_{t+\delta})|x_{t}, u_{t}]$ Use:  $V_{t+\delta}(x_{t+\delta}) =$  $V_t(x_t) + (\partial V_t / \partial t) (\delta t)$  $+ (\partial V_t / \partial x) (\delta x)$ +(1/2)( $\partial^2 V_t / \partial x^2$ )( $\delta x$ )<sup>2</sup> + o( $\delta_t^2$ ) (Can use this to obtain continuous-time results)



#### **Probabilistic Constraints**

• Basic (P) Model:

min  $c^T x$ 

- s.t.  $P(A^{i}(\omega) | x \ge h^{i}(\omega)) \ge \alpha^{i}, i=1,\ldots,m_{1}$
- Examples: Probability of loss greater than some level is at most 1- $\alpha_i$ ;

Probability of not meeting demand is at most  $1-\alpha_i$ ;

Note: sometimes these are given as separate (easier) and sometimes joint – unclear on utility implications

(may be easier to estimate than others)

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#### Issues with Probabilistic Constraints

#### • Convexity:

In general, the feasible region is not necessarily convex –

A=[1; -1]

$$h(\omega_1) = [0; -1] h(\omega_2) = [2; -3]$$

 $P(\omega_1) = P(\omega_2) = 0.5$ 

Nice property: quasi-concavity (including log-concavity) :  $P((1-\lambda)U+\lambda V) \ge min(P(U),P(V))$ 

Convex: if A fixed and h q-concave, then convex.

Nice properties with normal distribution, simple recourse

In general, find some deterministic approximation.

Results: equivalent recourse formulation (but often relies on knowing the solution).



• Finding deterministic (or stochastic) approximations:

• or they hold with given confidence.

### CHICAGO BOOTH Forms of Sensitivity

• For specific parameters:

Convexity in constraint parameters (h, T)

Concavity in linear objective (q)

• Also, note with respect to changes in distribution:

# CHICAGO BOOTH CAN Additional Inferences: Inverse Optimization

• Suppose given observed decisions *x*<sup>\*</sup>:



#### Questions and Answers

- When is a stochastic programming model consistent?
  - When it doesn't contradict observations of behavior (e.g., prices and quantities in markets)
- When is a stochastic program solvable?
  - When it has consistent properties (e.g., compact regions and continuous and bounded objectives)



## More Q and Q

- What should be true about an SP solution (and value)? (With some conditions:)
  - Convexity/concavity in certain parameters
  - Differentiability of objective wrt decisions
  - Properties linking prices (dual variables) and quantities (primal variables)
- What can be inferred from solving one problem?
  - Bounds based on solutions (primal, dual) and distances between distributions



### **Conclusions/Further Results**

- Basic properties enable:
  - Discovery about choices:
    - Preferences (including risk)
    - Constraints
  - Bases for computational methods
  - Inferences about solutions from samples
  - Implications on what information to gather
- More results on basic theory can help improve decisions and our understanding of how decisions are made

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• Thanks and questions?