

Formulations of Stochastic Programming Problems and Risk Aversion

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Why Probabilistic Models?

- Wealth of results of probability theory
- Connection to real data via statistics
- Universal language (engineering, economics, medicine, ...)
- Probability space $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, P)$
- Decision space $\mathcal{X}$
- Random outcome (e.g., cost) $Z_x(\omega)$, $Z : \mathcal{X} \times \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

Expected Value Model

$$\min_x \mathbb{E}[Z_x] = \int_{\Omega} Z_x(\omega) P(d\omega)$$

It optimizes the outcome **on average** (Law of Large Numbers?)

What is Risk?

Existence of **unlikely and undesirable** outcomes - high $Z_x(\omega)$ for some ω

Expected Utility Models (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944)

$$\min_{x \in X} \mathbb{E} [u(Z_x)] \quad \left(= \int_{\Omega} u(Z_x(\omega)) dP(\omega) \right)$$

$u : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is a nondecreasing **disutility** function

Rank Dependent Utility (Distortion) Models (Quiggin, 1982; Yaari, 1987)

$$\min_{x \in X} \int_0^1 F_{Z_x}^{-1}(p) dw(p) \quad F_{Z_x}^{-1}(\cdot) - \text{quantile function}$$

$w : [0, 1] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is a nondecreasing **rank dependent utility** function

Existence of utility functions is derived from systems of axioms,
but in practice they are difficult to elicit

Axioms of Expected Utility Theory

W is a **lottery** of Z and V with probabilities $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ and $(1 - \alpha)$, if the probability measure μ_W induced by W on $\mathbb{R}$ is the corresponding convex combination of the probability measures μ_Z and μ_V of Z and V :

$$\mu_W = \alpha\mu_Z + (1 - \alpha)\mu_V.$$

We write the lottery symbolically as

$$W = \alpha Z \oplus (1 - \alpha)V.$$

For law invariant preferences on the space of random vectors with values in $\mathbb{R}$, von Neumann introduced the axioms:

Independence Axiom: For all $Z, V, W \in \mathcal{Z}$ one has

$$Z \triangleleft V \implies \alpha Z \oplus (1 - \alpha)W \triangleleft \alpha V \oplus (1 - \alpha)W, \quad \forall \alpha \in (0, 1)$$

Archimedean Axiom: If $Z \triangleleft V \triangleleft W$, then $\alpha, \beta \in (0, 1)$ exist such that

$$\alpha Z \oplus (1 - \alpha)W \triangleleft V \triangleleft \beta Z \oplus (1 - \beta)W$$

Integral Representation

Suppose the total preorder $\preceq$ on $\mathcal{Z}$ is law invariant, and satisfies the independence and Archimedean axioms. Then it has an “affine” numerical representation $U : \mathcal{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$:

$$U(\alpha Z \oplus (1 - \alpha)V) = \alpha U(Z) + (1 - \alpha)U(V).$$

If $\preceq$ is **weakly continuous**, then a continuous and bounded function $u : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ exists, such that

$$U(Z) = \mathbb{E}[u(Z)] = \int_{\Omega} u(Z(\omega)) P(d\omega).$$

New proof by separation theorem - D. & R. 2012

In a more general setting, we may consider only r.v. with finite moments, and then **the boundedness condition on $u(\cdot)$ can be relaxed**.

$$U(Z) = \mathbb{E}[u(Z)] = \int_{\Omega} u(Z(\omega)) P(d\omega)$$

Monotonicity

The total preorder $\preceq$ is **monotonic** with respect to the partial order $\leq$, if $Z \leq V \implies Z \preceq V$.

We focus on $\mathcal{Z}$ containing integrable random vectors.

Risk Aversion

A preference relation $\preceq$ on $\mathcal{Z}$ is *risk-averse*, if $\mathbb{E}[Z|\mathcal{G}] \preceq Z$, for every $Z \in \mathcal{Z}$ and every σ -subalgebra $\mathcal{G}$ of $\mathcal{F}$.

Nondecreasing Convex Disutility

Suppose a total preorder $\preceq$ on $\mathcal{Z}$ is weakly continuous, monotonic, risk-averse, and satisfies the independence axiom. Then the utility function $u : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is **nondecreasing and convex**.

Axioms of Dual Utility Theory (Yaari 1987)

Real random variables Z_i , $i = 1, \dots, n$, are **comonotonic**, if

$$(Z_i(\omega) - Z_i(\omega'))(Z_j(\omega) - Z_j(\omega')) \geq 0$$

for all $\omega, \omega' \in \Omega$ and all $i, j = 1, \dots, n$.

Dual Independence Axiom: For all comonotonic random variables Z , V , and W in $\mathcal{Z}$ one has

$$Z \triangleleft V \implies \alpha Z + (1 - \alpha)W \triangleleft \alpha V + (1 - \alpha)W, \quad \forall \alpha \in (0, 1)$$

Dual Archimedean Axiom: For all comonotonic random variables Z , V , and W in $\mathcal{Z}$, satisfying the relations

$$Z \triangleleft V \triangleleft W,$$

there exist $\alpha, \beta \in (0, 1)$ such that

$$\alpha Z + (1 - \alpha)W \triangleleft V \triangleleft \beta Z + (1 - \beta)W$$

Affine Representation

If the total preorder $\preceq$ on $\mathcal{Z}$ is law invariant, and satisfies the dual independence and Archimedean axioms, then a numerical representation $U : \mathcal{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ of $\preceq$ exists, which satisfies for all comonotonic $Z, V \in \mathcal{Z}$ and all $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{R}_+$ the equation

$$U(\alpha Z + \beta V) = \alpha U(Z) + \beta U(V).$$

Integral Representation

Suppose $\mathcal{Z}$ is the set of bounded random variables. If, additionally, $\preceq$ is continuous in $\mathcal{L}_1$ and monotonic, then a bounded, nondecreasing, and continuous function $w : [0, 1] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ exists, such that

$$U(Z) = \int_0^1 F_Z^{-1}(p) dw(p), \quad Z \in \mathcal{Z}.$$

Proof by separation - D. & R. 2012

$$U(Z) = \int_0^1 F_Z^{-1}(p) dw(p), \quad Z \in \mathcal{Z} \quad (*)$$

Risk Aversion

A preference relation $\preceq$ on $\mathcal{Z}$ is *risk-averse*, if $\mathbb{E}[Z|\mathcal{G}] \preceq Z$, for every $Z \in \mathcal{Z}$ and every σ -subalgebra $\mathcal{G}$ of $\mathcal{F}$.

Convex Rank-Dependent Utility

Suppose a total preorder $\preceq$ on $\mathcal{Z}$ is continuous, monotonic, and satisfies the dual independence axiom. Then it is risk-averse if and only if it has the integral representation (*) with a **nondecreasing and convex** function $w : [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that $w(0) = 0$ and $w(1) = 1$.

Two Objectives

- Minimize the expected outcome, the **mean** $\mathbb{E}[Z_x]$
- Minimize a scalar measure of uncertainty of Z_x , the **risk** $r[Z_x]$

$$r[Z] = \text{Var}[Z] \quad (\text{Markowitz' model})$$

$$\sigma_p^+[Z] = \left(\mathbb{E}[(Z - \mathbb{E}Z)_+^p] \right)^{1/p} \quad (\text{semideviation})$$

$$\delta_\alpha^+[Z] = \min_{\eta} \mathbb{E} \left[\max \left(\eta - Z, \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} (Z - \eta) \right) \right] \quad (\text{deviation from quantile})$$

$r[Z_x]$ is **nonlinear w.r.t. probability** and possibly **nonconvex** in x

Example: Portfolio Optimization

$R_1, R_2, \dots, R_n$ - random return rates of securities

$x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n$ - fractions of the capital invested in the securities

Return rate of the portfolio (negative of)

$$Z_x = -(R_1 x_1 + R_2 x_2 + \dots + R_n x_n)$$

Risk Optimization with Fixed Mean

$$\begin{aligned} \min_x \quad & r[Z_x] \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \mathbb{E}[Z_x] = \mu \quad (\text{parameter}) \\ & x \in X_0. \end{aligned}$$

Combined Mean–Risk Optimization

$$\min_{x \in X_0} \rho[Z_x] = \mathbb{E}[Z_x] + \kappa r[Z_x], \quad 0 \leq \kappa \leq \kappa_{\max}$$

Interesting applications of **parametric optimization**

Nonlinear Programming Formulations for Discrete Distributions

Suppose Z has finitely many realizations $z_1, z_2, \dots, z_S$
with probabilities $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_S$

$$\begin{aligned}\rho(Z) &= \mathbb{E}[Z] + \kappa \sigma_m^+[Z] = \mathbb{E}[Z] + \kappa \left(\mathbb{E}[(Z - \mathbb{E}Z)_+^m] \right)^{1/m} \\ &= \sum_{s=1}^S p_s z_s + \kappa \left(\sum_{s=1}^S p_s \left(z_s - \sum_{j=1}^S p_j z_j \right)_+^m \right)^{1/m}\end{aligned}$$

Equivalent Problem (for $m = 1$ - linear programming)

$$\begin{aligned}\rho(Z) &= \min_{\mu} \quad \mu + \kappa \left(\sum_{s=1}^S p_s v_s^m \right)^{1/m} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \mu = \sum_{s=1}^S p_s z_s \\ & v_s \geq z_s - \mu, \quad s = 1, \dots, S \\ & v_s \geq 0, \quad s = 1, \dots, S\end{aligned}$$


Suppose the vector of return rates has S realizations with probabilities $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_S$

R_{js} - return rate of asset $j = 1, \dots, n$ in scenario $s = 1, \dots, S$

Equivalent Problem (for $m = 1$ - linear programming)

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{x, z, v, \mu} \quad & \mu + \kappa \left(\sum_{s=1}^S v_s^m \right)^{1/m} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \mu = \sum_{s=1}^S p_s z_s \\ & z_s = - \sum_{j=1}^n R_{sj} x_j, \quad s = 1, \dots, S \\ & v_s \geq z_s - \mu, \quad s = 1, \dots, S \\ & v_s \geq 0, \quad s = 1, \dots, S \\ & x \in X_0 \end{aligned}$$

Basket of 719 Securities. Mean–Semideviation Model



Key Requirement: Monotonicity

$$\rho(Z) = \mathbb{E}[Z] + \kappa r[Z]$$

Consistency with Stochastic Dominance (Ogryczak–R., 1997)

$$\mathbb{E}[u(Z)] \leq \mathbb{E}[u(W)], \forall \text{ nondecreasing and convex } u(\cdot) \Rightarrow \rho[Z] \leq \rho[W]$$

Consistency with Pointwise Order (Artzner *et. al.*, 1999)

$$Z \leq W \text{ a.s.} \Rightarrow \rho[Z] \leq \rho[W]$$

Mean–semideviation and mean–deviation from quantile models are consistent for $0 \leq \kappa \leq 1$, but **not mean–variance**.

Unique optimal solutions of consistent optimization models

$$\min_{x \in X} \rho(Z_x)$$

cannot be strictly dominated (in the corresponding sense)

Space of uncertain outcomes $\mathcal{Z} = \mathcal{L}_p(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, P)$, $p \in [1, \infty]$

A functional $\rho : \mathcal{Z} \rightarrow \overline{\mathbb{R}}$ is a **coherent risk measure** if it satisfies the following axioms

- **Convexity:** $\rho(\lambda Z + (1 - \lambda)W) \leq \lambda \rho(Z) + (1 - \lambda)\rho(W)$
 $\forall \lambda \in (0, 1), Z, W \in \mathcal{Z}$
- **Monotonicity:** If $Z \leq W$ then $\rho(Z) \leq \rho(W)$, $\forall Z, W \in \mathcal{Z}$
- **Translation Equivariance:** $\rho(Z + a) = \rho(Z) + a$, $\forall Z \in \mathcal{Z}, a \in \mathbb{R}$
- **Positive Homogeneity:** $\rho(\tau Z) = \tau \rho(Z)$, $\forall Z \in \mathcal{Z}, \tau \geq 0$

Kijima-Ohnishi (1993) – no monotonicity

Artzner-Delbaen-Eber-Heath (1999–) - space $\mathcal{L}_\infty$

R.-Shapiro (2005) – spaces $\mathcal{L}_p, \dots$

Good news: $\mathbb{E}[Z]$ is coherent

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Coherence of Mean–Semideviation

For simplicity, semideviation of order $m = 1$ with $\kappa = 1$:

$$\rho(Z) = \mathbb{E}[Z] + \mathbb{E}\left[(Z - \mathbb{E}Z)_+\right] = \mathbb{E}\left\{\max\left(\mathbb{E}[Z], Z\right)\right\}$$

Convexity follows from the convexity of $Z \mapsto \max(\mathbb{E}[Z], Z)$ a.s.

Monotonicity follows from monotonicity of $Z \mapsto \max(\mathbb{E}[Z], Z)$ a.s.

Translation follows from translation of $Z \mapsto \max(\mathbb{E}[Z], Z)$ a.s.

Pos. Homogeneity follows from pos. homogeneity of $\max(\mathbb{E}[Z], Z)$ a.s.

Convex combination of coherent measures of risk is coherent

$$\rho(Z) = \lambda_1 \rho_1(Z) + \lambda_2 \rho_2(Z) + \cdots + \lambda_L \rho_L(Z)$$

$$\lambda_1 + \lambda_2 + \cdots + \lambda_L = 1,$$

$$\lambda_1 \geq 0, \lambda_2 \geq 0, \dots, \lambda_L \geq 0$$

$$\rho(Z) = \mathbb{E}[Z] + \kappa \mathbb{E}\left[(Z - \mathbb{E}Z)_+\right] \text{ is coherent for } \kappa \in [0, 1]$$

The Value at Risk at level $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ of a random cost $Z \in \mathcal{Z}$:

$$\text{VaR}_\alpha^+(Z) \triangleq \inf \{ \eta : F_Z(\eta) \geq 1 - \alpha \} = F_Z^{-1}(1 - \alpha)$$

Monotonicity: $Z \leq V \implies \text{VaR}_\alpha^+(Z) \leq \text{VaR}_\alpha^+(V)$

Translation: $\text{VaR}_\alpha^+(Z + c) = \text{VaR}_\alpha^+(Z) + c$, for all $c \in \mathbb{R}$

Positive Homogeneity: $\text{VaR}_\alpha^+(\gamma Z) = \gamma \text{VaR}_\alpha^+(Z)$, for all $\gamma \geq 0$

However, **it is not convex**

Counterexample: Two independent variables

$$Z = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{with probability } 1 - p \\ 1 & \text{with probability } p \end{cases} \quad V = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{with probability } 1 - p \\ 1 & \text{with probability } p \end{cases}$$

For $p < \alpha < 1$ we have $\text{VaR}_\alpha^+(Z) = \text{VaR}_\alpha^+(V) = 0$

If $p < \alpha < 1 - (1 - p)^2$, we have **non-convexity**

$$\text{VaR}_\alpha^+(\lambda Z + (1 - \lambda)V) > 0 = \lambda \text{VaR}_\alpha^+(Z) + (1 - \lambda) \text{VaR}_\alpha^+(V)$$

$$\text{AV@R}_\alpha^+(Z) \triangleq \frac{1}{\alpha} \int_0^\alpha \text{V@R}_\beta^+(Z) \, d\beta$$

If the $(1 - \alpha)$ -quantile of Z is unique

$$\text{AV@R}_\alpha^+(Z) = \frac{1}{\alpha} \int_{\text{V@R}_\alpha^+(Z)}^\infty z \, dF_Z(z) = \mathbb{E}[Z \mid Z \geq \text{V@R}_\alpha^+(Z)]$$

Extremal representation

$$\text{AV@R}_\alpha^+(Z) = \inf_{\eta \in \mathbb{R}} \left\{ \eta + \frac{1}{\alpha} \mathbb{E}[(Z - \eta)_+] \right\}$$

The minimizer $\eta = \text{V@R}_\alpha(Z)$

Connection to weighted deviation from α -quantile:

$$\delta_\alpha^+(Z) = \text{AV@R}_\alpha^+(Z) - \mathbb{E}[Z], \quad \alpha \in [0, 1].$$

Extremal representation

$$\text{AV@R}_\alpha^+(Z) = \inf_{\eta \in \mathbb{R}} \left\{ \eta + \frac{1}{\alpha} \mathbb{E}[(Z - \eta)_+] \right\}$$

Convexity follows from joint convexity in (η, Z) of $\{\dots\}$

Monotonicity follows from monotonicity w.r.t. Z of $\{\dots\}$

Translation follows from $\eta \leftrightarrow \eta - c$ in $\{\dots\}$

Pos. Homogeneity follows from pos. homogeneity in (η, Z) of $\{\dots\}$

Suppose Z has finitely many realizations $z_1, z_2, \dots, z_S$ with probabilities $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_S$

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{v, \eta} \quad & \eta + \frac{1}{\alpha} \sum_{s=1}^S p_s v_s \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & v_s \geq z_s - \eta, \quad s = 1, \dots, S \\ & v_s \geq 0, \quad s = 1, \dots, S \end{aligned}$$

For portfolios we have to add the constraints

$$\begin{aligned} z_s &= - \sum_{j=1}^n R_{sj} x_j, \quad s = 1, \dots, S \\ x &\in X_0 \end{aligned}$$

and include z and x into the decision variables

Conjugate Duality of Risk Measures

Pairing of a linear topological space $\mathcal{Z}$ with a linear topological space $\mathcal{Y}$ of regular signed measures on Ω with the bilinear form

$$\langle \mu, Z \rangle = \mathbb{E}_\mu[Z] = \int_{\Omega} Z(\omega) \mu(d\omega)$$

We assume standard conditions on pairing and the polarity: $(\mathcal{Z}_+)^{\circ} = \mathcal{Y}_-$

Dual Representation Theorem

If $\rho : \mathcal{Z} \rightarrow \overline{\mathbb{R}}$ is a lower semicontinuous* coherent risk measure, then

$$\rho(Z) = \max_{\mu \in \mathcal{A}} \int_{\Omega} Z(\omega) \mu(d\omega), \quad \forall Z \in \mathcal{Z}$$

with a convex closed $\mathcal{A} \subset \mathcal{P}$ (set of probability measures in $\mathcal{Y}$).

Delbaen (2001), Föllmer–Schied (2002), R.–Shapiro (2005),

Rockafellar–Uryasev–Zabarankin (2006), ...

* Lower semicontinuity is automatic if ρ is finite and $\mathcal{Z}$ is a Banach lattice

$Z \sim V$ means that Z and V have the same distribution, $\mu_Z = \mu_V$.

$\rho : \mathcal{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is **law invariant** if $Z \sim V \implies \rho(Z) = \rho(V)$

Kusuoka Theorem

If $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, P)$ is **atomless** and $\rho : \mathcal{L}_1(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, P) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is **law invariant**, then

$$\rho(Z) = \sup_{m \in \mathcal{M}} \int_0^1 \text{AV@R}_\alpha^+(Z) m(d\alpha)$$

where $\mathcal{M}$ is a convex set of probability measures on $(0, 1]$.

Spectral measure

$$\rho(V) = \int_0^1 \text{AV@R}_\alpha^+(Z) m(d\alpha)$$

Spectral measures have dual utility form:

$$\rho(Z) = \int_0^1 F_Z^{-1}(\beta) dw(\beta)$$

Optimization of Risk Measures

“Minimize” over $x \in X$ a random outcome $Z_x(\omega) = f(x, \omega)$, $\omega \in \Omega$

Composite Optimization Problem

$$\min_{x \in X} \rho(Z_x) \quad (P)$$

Theorem

Let $x \mapsto Z_x(\omega)$ be convex and $\rho(\cdot)$ be coherent. Suppose that $\hat{x} \in X$ is an optimal solution of (P) and $\rho(\cdot)$ is continuous at $Z_{\hat{x}}$. Then there exists a probability measure $\hat{\mu} \in \partial\rho(Z_{\hat{x}}) \subseteq \mathcal{A}$ such that $\hat{x}$ solves

$$\min_{x \in X} \mathbb{E}_{\hat{\mu}}[Z_x] = \min_{x \in X} \max_{\mu \in \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E}_{\mu}[Z_x]$$

We also have the **duality relation**:

$$\min_{x \in X} \rho(Z_x) = \max_{\mu \in \mathcal{A}} \inf_{x \in X} \mathbb{E}_{\mu}[Z_x]$$

Duality in Portfolio Optimization - Game Model

Suppose the vector of return rates of assets has S realizations

R_{js} - return rate of asset $j = 1, \dots, n$ in scenario $s = 1, \dots, S$

Portfolio return (negative) in scenario s

$$Z_s(x) = - \sum_{j=1}^n R_{js} x_j$$

Portfolio Problem

$$\min_{x \in X} \rho(Z(x))$$

By homogeneity, we may assume that $\sum_{j=1}^n x_j = 1$

Equivalent Matrix Game

$$\max_{x \in X} \min_{\mu \in \mathcal{A}} \sum_{j=1}^n \sum_{s=1}^S x_j R_{js} \mu_s$$

x - mixed strategy of the investor

μ - mixed strategy of the opponent (market)

Expected-Value Model

$$\min_{x \in X} c^T x + \mathbb{E}[Q(x)]$$

where $Q(x)$ is the optimal value of the **random second-stage problem**

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & q^T y \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & Tx + Wy = h, \\ & y \geq 0, \end{aligned}$$

(q, T, h) - **random data** of the second-stage problem

- c is deterministic
- (q, T, h) become known after the first stage

For finite scenario case - powerful decomposition methods

$$\min_{x \in X} \rho_1(c^T x + Q(x))$$

where $Q(x)$ is the optimal value of the **second-stage problem**

$$\begin{aligned} Q(x) = \min \rho_2(q^T y) \\ \text{s.t. } Tx + Wy = h, \\ y \geq 0, \end{aligned}$$

and $\xi = (q, T, h)$ - random data of the second-stage problem

- c is random
- (T, h) become known after the first stage
- q may be still unknown (conditional distribution)

Second-stage scenarios: $c_s, T_s, h_s, s = 1, \dots, S$

Final scenarios: $q_{sj}, j \in J(s)$

$$\min_{x \in X} \rho_1(c^T x + Q(x))$$

where $Q(x)$ is the optimal value of the **second-stage problem**;
In scenario s its value is

$$\begin{aligned} Q_s(x) &= \min \rho_{2s}(q_s^T y) \\ \text{s.t. } &T_s x + W y = h_s, \\ &y \geq 0, \end{aligned}$$

q_s is random and has realizations $q_{sj}, j \in J(s)$

This structure of the problem follows from the general theory of dynamic measures of risk (lecture tomorrow)

Dual Representation of the Two-Stage Problem

Risk-averse first-stage problem

$$\min_{x \in X} \max_{\mu \in \mathcal{A}} \sum_{s=1}^S \mu_s [c_s^T x + Q_s(x)]$$

Risk-averse second-stage problem

$$\begin{aligned} Q_s(x) &= \min_y \max_{v \in \mathcal{B}_s} \sum_{j \in J(s)} v_j q_j^T y \\ \text{s.t. } T_s x + W_s y &= h_s \quad (\text{multipliers } \pi_s) \\ y &\geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

The sets of probability measures:

$$\mathcal{A} = \partial \rho_1(0)$$

$$\mathcal{B}_s = \partial \rho_{2s}(0)$$

Z_x - random outcome (e.g., cost)

Y - **benchmark** random outcome, e.g. $Y(\omega) = Z_{\bar{x}}(\omega)$ for some $\bar{x} \in X$

New Model

$$\begin{array}{ll} \min \mathbb{E}[Z_x] & \text{(or some other objective)} \\ \text{subject to } Z_x \leq_{\mathcal{U}} Y & \text{(stochastic ordering constraint)} \\ x \in X \end{array}$$

Z_x is preferred over Y by all decision makers having disutility functions in the generator $\mathcal{U}$:

$$\mathbb{E}[u(Z_x)] \leq \mathbb{E}[u(Y)] \quad \forall u \in \mathcal{U}$$

All nondecreasing $u(\cdot)$ - **first order stochastic dominance** $\leq_{\text{st}}$

All nondecreasing convex $u(\cdot)$ - **increasing convex order** $\leq_{\text{icx}}$

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mathbb{E}[Z_x] \\ & \text{subject to } Z_x \leq_{\text{icx}} Y \\ & \quad x \in X \end{aligned}$$

X - **convex** set in $\mathcal{X}$ (separable locally convex Hausdorff vector space)

$x \mapsto Z_x$ is a **continuous** operator from $\mathcal{X}$ to $\mathcal{L}_1(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, P)$

$x \mapsto Z_x(\omega)$ is **convex** for P -almost all $\omega \in \Omega$

Primal: $\mathbb{E}[u(Z_x)] \leq \mathbb{E}[u(Y)]$ for all convex nondecreasing $u : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

Inverse: $\int_0^1 F_{Z_x}^{-1}(p) dw(p) \leq \int_0^1 F_Y^{-1}(p) dw(p)$ for all convex nondecreasing $w : [0, 1] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

Main Results

- Utility functions $u : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and rank dependent utility functions $w : [0, 1] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ play the roles of Lagrange multipliers
- Expected utility models and rank dependent utility models are Lagrangian relaxations of the problem

Lagrangian in Direct Form

$$L(x, u) = \mathbb{E}[Z_x + u(Z_x) - u(Y)]$$

$u(\cdot)$ - convex function on $\mathbb{R}$

Theorem

Assume Uniform Dominance Condition (a form of Slater constraint qualification). If $\hat{x}$ is an optimal solution of the problem then there exists a function $\hat{u} \in \mathcal{U}$ such that

$$L(\hat{x}, \hat{u}) = \min_{x \in X} L(x, \hat{u}) \quad (1)$$

$$\mathbb{E}[\hat{u}(Z_{\hat{x}})] = \mathbb{E}[\hat{u}(Y)] \quad (2)$$

Conversely, if for some function $\hat{u} \in \mathcal{U}$ an optimal solution $\hat{x}$ of (1) satisfies the dominance constraint and (2), then $\hat{x}$ is optimal

Implied Rank Utility (Distortion) Function

Lagrangian in Inverse Form

$$\Phi(x, w) = \int_0^1 F_{Z_x}^{-1}(p) d(p + w(p)) - \int_0^1 F_Y^{-1}(p) dw(p)$$

$w(\cdot)$ - convex function on $[0, 1]$

Theorem

Assume Uniform Dominance Condition (a form of Slater constraint qualification). If $\hat{x}$ is an optimal solution of the problem, then there exists a function $\hat{w} \in \mathcal{W}$ such that

$$\Phi(\hat{x}, \hat{w}) = \min_{x \in X} \Phi(x, \hat{w}) \quad (3)$$

$$\int_0^1 F_{Z_{\hat{x}}}^{-1}(p) d\hat{w}(p) = \int_0^1 F_Y^{-1}(p) d\hat{w}(p) \quad (4)$$

If for some $\hat{w} \in \mathcal{W}$ an optimal solution $\hat{x}$ of (3) satisfies the inverse dominance constraint and (4), then $\hat{x}$ is optimal